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CRITICIZING THE COURTS: A LAWYER'S DUTY 
Roger J. Miner* 
In observing the work of lawyers in the courts in which I 
have served, as well as in other courts, I have been impressed 
generally with the service that the bar has rendered in the 
representation of clients. I have not been quite so impressed, 
however, with the performance of the bar in the discharge of its 
duty to socie·ty as a whole. It is the willingness to accept this 
public responsibility that distinguishes the bar as a profession. 
The value of the calling is diminished to the extent that any one 
lawyer shirks his. or her professional obligation of service to 
the community. 
There are many duties implicated in the concept of public 
responsibility -- the duty to undertake the representation of 
indigent clients without chargel Cif more lawyers performed this 
duty, perhaps the public expense for such representation could be 
greatly reduced or eliminated); the duty to see that able and 
honest men and women are appointed or elected as judges;2 the 
duty to aid in the improvement of legal education;3 the duty to 
maintain the competence and integrity of the bar,4 and to 
disclose violations of the rules of professional conduct;S the 
duty to set an example and maintain public confidence by avoiding 
even minor violations of law;6 the duty to seek legislative and 
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administrative changes to improve the law and the legal system;? 
and the duty to educate the publics and to protect it from the 
unauthorized practice of law.9 
In my opinion, one of the most important societal duties of 
lawyers is the duty to criticize the courts. It is my premise 
that informed criticism of the courts and their decisions is not 
merely a right but an ethical obligation imposed upon every 
member of the bar. I also believe that judges should not respond 
to such criticism, directly or indirectly, since judicial 
response dampens the enthusiasm of the bar and disserves the 
public interest. 
There is a Canon in the Code of Professional Responsibility 
that instructs lawyers to assist in improving the legal system.10 
The Ethical Considerations relating to that Canon observe that 
lawyers are especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the 
system and to initiate corrective measures.11 They encourage the 
legal profession to support changes in the law when existing 
rules eventuate in unjust results.12 The Preamble to the new 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the American Bar 
Association urges that lawyers should employ their knowledge to 
reform the law.13 In my opinion these admonitions speak to a 
duty on the part of lawyers to identify and discuss incorrect 
actions by the courts, subject only to the requirement that the 
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criticism be impelled by a good-faith desire for improvement in 
the law and the legal system. 
Malicious or false statements about a judge or disruptive or 
contemptuous conduct in the court.iciom, of course, never can be 
countenanced. I have kept with me for nearly thirty years a case 
I read in law. school regarding a penalty imposed for behavior of 
this type. The decision is taken from the ancient English 
Reports and is one of those collected by Sir James Dyar, sometime 
Chief Justice of Common Pleas. It is reported as follows: 
RICHARDSON, Chief Justice of C.B. at the 
assizes at Salisbury in the summer of 1631 
was assaulted by a prisoner condemned there 
for felony, who after his condemnation threw 
a brick bat at the said Judge, which narrowly 
missed; and for this an indictment was 
immediately drawn ••• against the prisoner, 
and his right hand cut off and fixed to the 
gibbet, upon which he was himself immediately 
hanged in the presence of the Court.14 
It seems to me that the judge overreacted somewhat in spite of 
the provocation. Of course, there are those today who would 
consider tossing a brick to be "protected expression." I do 
realize that occasionally it is necessary for a lawyer to bite 
his or her tongue when in the presence of some particularly 
arbitrary tyrant in a black robe. My father, who has been 
practicing law for sixty years, holds in the highest regard the 
lawyer who made some intemperate remark during a long and heated 
argument with a judge. - When the judge shouted: "Counsellor, you 
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have been showing your contempt of this court," the lawyer 
responded: "No, your honor, I have been trying to conceal it." 
While lawyers generally feel free to criticize the state of 
the law in relation to rules of court, statutes and even the 
Constitution itself, there is a noticeable reluctance to 
criticize judge-made law, specific judicial decisions or 
individual judges. Yet, the public responsibility function of 
the bar is just as implicated in the latter as in the former. 
Why the distinction? ·r think that the answer lies in the 
unfortunate, but well-grounded, fear on the part of attorneys 
that affronts to tender judicial sensibilities may result in 
unnecessary antagonisms, disciplinary action or worse. For 
example, in 1830, Judge James H. Peck of the United States 
District Court for the District of Missouri disbarred and 
imprisoned a lawyer for publishing a letter critical of one of 
his decisions.15 Although this disgraceful episode led to an 
impeachment proceeding and caused Congress to curtail the summary 
contempt power of the federal courts,16 echoes of the Peck incident 
were heard in a decision handed down by the Supreme Court in 1985. 
The decision reversed a six-month suspension from federal 
practice imposed upon Robert J. Snyder by the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals for conduct said to be prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and unbecoming a member of the bar.17 
Snyder's difficulties stemmed from a letter he wrote to the 
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United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. 
The letter was written after the circuit court had twice returned 
his Criminal Justice Act fee application for insufficient 
documentation. In his correspondence, Snyder refused to provide 
further information, criticized generally the inadequacy of the 
fees authorized in similar cases, expressed his disgust at the 
treatment afforded him by the circuit and directed that his name 
be removed from the list of attorneys available for criminal 
defense assignments .18 The district court judge, findi_ng nothing 
offensive in the letter, and perceiving some merit in Snyder's 
criticisms, passed the letter on to the circuit. A three-judge 
panel of the circ.ui t ultimately found that the statements, which 
Snyder refused to retract, were disrespectful, contentious and 
beyond the bounds of proper comment and criticism.19 
In reversing the panel decision, then Chief Justice Burger 
wrote: "We do not consider a lawyer's criticism of the 
administration of the [Criminal Justice] Act or criticism of 
inequities in assignments under the Act as· cause for discipline 
or suspension. • • • Officers of the court may appropriately 
express criticism on such matters."20 The Chief Justice observed 
that the circuit court had acknowledged the meritorious nature of 
Snyder's criticism and, as a result, had instituted a study of 
the administration of the Criminal Justice Act.21 In light of 
that observation, I believe that the Chief Justice missed an 
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excellent opportunity to comment on the attorney's duty to 
criticize the courts and the beneficial purposes served by the 
performance of that duty. Snyder's actions were well within the 
bounds of the public responsibility he assumed when he became a 
member of the bar. This is so because a lawyer is obliged not 
only to educate the public about the law, the legal system and 
the judges, but to inform the courts as well. 
Justice Jackson once commented that "lawyers are the only 
group in a community who really know how well judicial work is 
being done. The public may rightfully look to them to be the 
first to condemn practices or tendencies which they see departing 
from the best judicial traditions. 11 22 Justice Brewer said: "It 
is a mistake to suppose that the Supreme Court is either honored 
or helped by being spoken of as beyond criticism. On the 
contrary, the life and character of its justices should be the 
objects of constant watchfulness by all, and its judgments 
subject to the freest criticism."23 "I have no patience," said 
Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "with the complaint that criticism 
of judicial action involves any lack of respect for the courts. 
When the courts deal, as ours do, with great public questions, 
the only protection against unwise decisions, and even judicial 
usurpation, is careful scrutiny of their action and fearless 
comment upon it."24 
Some years ago, in answer to a contention that criticism of 
the Supreme Court and its decisions by the bar was unwise, 
Raymond Moley, the political analyst, wrote the following: 
The bar· in this· instance is acting in its 
most significant role. A lawyer is something 
more than a plain citizen. He is by tradition 
and law an officer of the court and an agent of the 
government. To refrain from guidance would be to 
shirk the bar's responsibility, as a professional 
association, to the public and to government. 
The Court is a responsible, human institution. 
To elevate it above criticism would be to create 
a tyranny above the law and above the government 
of which it is a part.25 
And so it is that when the Attorney General of the United 
States publicly criticizes certain decisions of the Supreme 
Court, as he has done in recent years,26 he is acting in the 
highest traditions of the legal profession. By leading serious 
discussions of constitutional doctrine important to the citizenry 
and to the courts, he performs the public service encouraged by 
Moley and by Justices Jackson, Brewer and Stone. It ill behooves 
members of the bar to ridicule and abuse a fellow member of the 
profession for fostering the robust and uninhibited debate that 
is the hallmark of a free society. When Stephen A. Douglas 
denounced Abraham Lincoln for questioning the validity of the 
infamous Dred Scott decision, Lincoln replied: 
We believe as much as [Mr.] Douglas 
(perhaps morel in obedience to and respect 
for the judicial department of government. 
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We think its decisions on constitutional 
questions, when fully settled, should control 
not only the particular case decided, but the 
general policy of the country, subject to be 
disturbed only by amendments of the 
Constitution, as provided in that instrument 
itself. More than this would be revolution. 
But we think the Dred Scott decision is 
erroneous. We know the court that made it 
has often overrruled its own decisions, and 
we shall do what we can to have it overrule 
this.27 
Lincoln was a great lawyer who understood well the public 
responsibility of the bar. 
It has never been the place of a judge, however, to respond 
to specific criticism, and I think that it is unseemly for 
Justices of the Supreme Court to engage in public argument with 
the Attorney General or any other lawyer for the purpose of 
defending the position of the Court on one issue or another.28 
Such discourse not only detracts from the dignity of the court 
but also communicates an unwillingness to maintain the openness 
of mind so essential for the proper performance of the judicial 
role.29 When the judiciary undertakes a point-by-point defense 
of criticism leveled by members of the bar, it discourages what 
it should encourage and protect. Even in the case of unfair and 
unjust criticism, the bench should remain silent, leaving to the 
bar its ethical obligation to come to the defense of the 
judiciary in such situations.30 It long has been recognized that 
judges, "not being wholly free to defend themselves, are entitled 
to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism."31 
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\ When Justice Brennan wrote in the Sawyer case that "lawyers are 
free to criticise the state of the law,"32 he reserved no 
rebuttal time for the judiciary. 
Let me hasten to add that there are numerous matters upon 
which judges can and should be heard -- matters affecting 
administration of the legal system, improvements in substantive 
and procedural law and ethical standards.33 A judge also should 
teach and write about the law in an expository way, pointing to 
trends and changes in decisions already·written·and in 
legislation already adopted.34 Judges should encourage debate 
about controversial constitutional and legal issues.35 I have 
lectured and written about the public accountability of judges 
the need for judges to report to the citizenry about developments 
in the law and the legal system.36 Others have advocated 
judicial participation in policy-making where matters affecting 
the judicial process are concerned. Judge Irving R. Kaufman, my 
colleague on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, holds that 
"[j]udges may not merely express their views on matters within 
their judicial province, but have an obligation to do so in the 
public interest.•37 However this may be, there is no reason for 
judges to argue the merits of their decisions or views directly 
with their critics. It should always be remembered that judges 
have an unfair advantage in any debate with lawyers, because 
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judicial decisions -- at least until reversed, modified, 
distinguished or overruled -- are the last word. 
The judiciary should assure the bar that critical comments 
of all kinds are welcomed. It should heed the message of Justice 
Frankfurter that "judges must be kept mindful of their 
limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a 
vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor however 
blunt."38 The Justices of the Supreme Court and of every other 
court in the land must recognize, as did Frankfurter, that 
lawyers "are under a special responsibility to exercise 
fearlessness"39 in criticizing the courts. 
Without question, the judiciary is accountable to the 
public, just as any other public institution is accountable to 
the public. If judges are arbitrary, if their behavior is 
improper, if their decisions are not well-grounded in 
constitutional and legal principles, if their reasoning is 
faulty, the bar is in the best position to observe and evaluate 
the deficiencies, to inform the public and to suggest corrections. 
When lawyers engage in criticism of the courts for constructive 
and positive purposes, grounded in good faith and reason, the 
judiciary is strengthened, the rule of law is reinforced and the 
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